This is a big ask, I’m fully aware of that. But I keep thinking about taking the key management entirely out of the system memory. Software-based key management exposes encryption keys to system memory, creating vulnerabilities against sophisticated attackers with local system access. Even with strong master passwords and memory clearing, cryptographic keys must exist in system RAM during vault operations.
Proposed Solution
Add PKCS#11 Hardware Security Module support enabling:
- Vault encryption/decryption operations performed entirely within tamper-resistant hardware
- Private keys never exposed to system memory or software stacks
- Integration with existing enterprise hardware security infrastructure
- PIN-based authentication directly on hardware devices
Supported Hardware
Immediate targets:
- CAC/PIV cards: Military and government smart cards with onboard secure elements
- Nitrokey HSM: Open-source hardware security modules with Common Criteria certification
- YubiKey PIV mode: Hardware security key PIV functionality for encryption operations
- TPM 2.0: Platform-integrated secure elements on modern computers
Technical Implementation
Desktop Applications: PKCS#11 interface integration for Windows, macOS, and Linux Mobile Platforms: Platform-specific secure element APIs (iOS Secure Enclave, Android Hardware Security Module) Performance: Hardware operations add 200-500ms latency - acceptable for high-security use cases
Precedent:
- Military CAC infrastructure demonstrates large-scale hardware security deployment
- OnlyKey proves hardware password management viability
- Enterprise demand exists based on current workaround solutions