This is where the time it takes may reflect the resources you can allocate to the problem. In this case, look at the ballpark calculation of cost on Passwordbits (typically, you still have to rent the botnet, or there’s an opportunity cost if you own the botnet). If the cost for renting a botnet is 10 times less than the ballpark calculation, what passphrase do you need with the default Argon2id configuration that you already use? Adding a word may be enough. Remember that typical criminals use ready-made solutions, and there may be no direct service available to allow brute-forcing an encrypted vault using a botnet.
- Use a 256-bit entropy password for your Bitwarden account. At some entropy point before 256 bits (because of the KDF), attacking the password becomes equivalent to attacking the key used for encryption directly, which is considered “impossible.”
- Use an offline password manager (like KeePassXC) to store your Bitwarden password. Use a 4-10 word passphrase to protect it, utilizing Argon2 KDF, maximizing the memory (which you can do more than with Bitwarden) and as many iterations as you can tolerate for the slowdown. Store the database file on detached devices only (USB, SD card, HDD, SSD, etc.).
- Alternatively, because of the options available for KeePassXC, use security keys that support challenge-response (like the more expensive YubiKey) to lock down your KeePassXC database, with a more manageable passphrase (that protects against casual local observations).
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