Thanks for the continued feedback everyone!
Regarding worst case scenario where an email account is compromised or you don’t have access, I personally have individual and organizational vault back-ups in multiple places so that I can spin up a new Bitwarden account at any time.
I also prefer to use a zero knowledge end to end encrypted email service with 2FA enabled, and use securely stored bookmarks in web browser or launch button in Bitwarden to avoid phishing attempts when typing in address incorrectly etc… (most hacks are still phishing based).
My understanding is that using this method, you would not be able to restore attachments, or any other data not included in the .json exports (I’m not certain, but I think password histories and perhaps Sends might be lost, as well). Is this correct, or do you have a work-around?
Also, if you want to use your backup to populate a new vault, it must be an unencrypted export, correct? (as the encryption keys won’t match)
Would you mind explaining this method? How do you secure the storage of your browser bookmarks?
With regards to the feature request discussed in this thread, perhaps a compromise might be to have the passwordless “reset” method immediately disable the vault for a specified time period (1 week? 30 days? User-configurable?) instead of deleting it immediately. During this period, the user should be provided some method for cancelling the “reset”, but this would require some identity authentication method that could not be easily spoofed (perhaps tied to the payment method for subscriptions?). Or perhaps the “reset” should be cancellable only by an emergency contact? In any case, it may be possible to allow for some secure method to undo the “reset” and re-enable the vault; if the vault “reset” is not successfully cancelled by the end of the specified period, only then would the vault actually be deleted.